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SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT TEAM LLC V. DOE: 
 THE RIGHT TO ANONYMOUS SPEECH POST-JUDGMENT 
  
Kelly Waldo* 
The Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in Signature Management 
Team LLC v. Doe addressed an issue of first impression in digital 
privacy law, finding that anonymous internet defendants do not 
automatically forfeit their First Amendment right to anonymity once 
they are found liable in a civil lawsuit. The court’s recognition that 
the right to anonymity can extend post-judgment represents a 
modest step forward for advocates of the right to remain 
anonymous; however, some of the rationales and assumptions used 
to reach this holding could prove detrimental. The court’s 
formulation of a presumption in favor of unmasking liable 
defendants introduces a puzzling standard, which fails to adequately 
protect defendants against the irreversible harm of unwanted 
disclosure of an anonymous identity. Further, the court’s newly 
introduced test for balancing the rights of wronged plaintiffs against 
anonymous defendants misconstrues the nature of the public’s 
interest in open judicial proceedings, and understates the true value 
of anonymity to online speakers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Anonymous speech is one of the core features that makes 
communication on the internet so unique.1 Anonymity lends greater 
freedom to express unpopular opinions without fear of personal 
retaliation, aids the operations of those who need anonymity to 
function (like whistleblowers and undercover investigators), and 
overall encourages a more robust exchange of ideas than would 
otherwise occur if individuals’ true identities were always linked to 
their speech.2 Courts have long recognized the right to speak 
anonymously as a fundamental aspect of free speech, a principle 
                                                 
 1 See Anonymity, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,https://www.eff.org/issues/
anonymity (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
 2 Id. 
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which has been extended modernly to protect speakers’ rights to 
participate in anonymous speech online.3 
However, anonymous speakers on the internet are not always 
virtuous actors, and sometimes their online conduct intrudes on the 
rights of others.4 When the conduct of an anonymous speaker is 
particularly harmful, their victims may seek reprisal in court. Since 
the advent of the internet, courts have wrestled with both the 
mechanics and the ethics of lawsuits against anonymous online 
speakers—specifically, what circumstances justify a court in 
revealing the identity of an anonymous defendant.5 Historically, 
these issues have arisen when a plaintiff requests that a court 
disclose the identity of an anonymous online defendant who has 
wronged them.6 Courts have developed a number of tests and factors 
to consider in determining whether and when a plaintiff’s desire to 
unmask an anonymous defendant supersedes a defendant’s First 
Amendment right to anonymous speech.7 
To date, these “anonymous speaker privilege” cases have 
focused on revealing an anonymous speaker’s identity during the 
discovery phase of a lawsuit.8 However, a recent Sixth Circuit case 
has addressed a new and significant corollary: how does the analysis 
change when the lawsuit is already over, and the anonymous 
                                                 
 3 See id. (“The US Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized rights to speak 
anonymously derived from the First Amendment. . . . These long-standing rights 
to anonymity and the protections it affords are critically important for the 
Internet.”). 
 4 See Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal 
Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 324 (2008) (“New technology has made harassment 
more possible and powerful online even as it has empowered modern-day 
pamphleteers to speak anonymously to ever-growing audiences.”). 
 5 See Marian Riedy & Kim Sperduto, Revisiting the “Anonymous Speaker 
Privilege,” 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 249, 249–50 (2012). 
 6 See id. at 250 (“During the last decade [courts] have adopted special rules 
governing the compelled disclosure of the identity of a John Doe defendant in 
private civil lawsuits when that John Doe is alleged to have committed some 
wrongdoing online.”). 
 7 See id. at 255–70 for an overview of these tests. 
 8 Aaron Mackey, Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even 
After Speakers Lose Lawsuits, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/12/court-recognizes-first-amendment-right-
anonymity-even-after-speakers-lose-lawsuits. 
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defendant has lost? Signature Management Team, LLC v. Doe9 
addresses this issue of first impression, and formulates a novel 
balancing test to help courts determine when an anonymous internet 
defendant’s identity may be disclosed post-judgment. On the whole, 
the court’s holding represents an important recognition of the right 
to online anonymity.10 However, the dubious assumptions behind 
this new balancing test, together with the court’s introduction of a 
new presumption favoring unmasking anonymous defendants, 
renders this holding only a cautious victory for advocates of 
anonymous online speech. 
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Section II presents a brief 
overview of the history of the First Amendment right to anonymous 
speech and provides rationales for why anonymous online speech 
deserves protection, while engaging with the counter-arguments of 
advocates of restricting anonymous speech rights. Section III 
examines the modern growth of the right to anonymous speech on 
the internet and details the development of the anonymous speaker 
privilege, which courts use to determine when an anonymous 
speaker may be unmasked during discovery. Section IV introduces 
the Signature Management case, its holdings and rationales, and 
emphasizes why its outcome is notable as compared to previous 
anonymous online speech cases. Section V evaluates the court’s 
holding, maintaining that while its recognition of a continued right 
to anonymity post-judgment represents a modest success for 
anonymous speech rights online, the court’s rationales are 
problematic and may be detrimental to the right to anonymity if 
applied in subsequent cases. 
                                                 
 9 Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC v. Doe, 876 F.3d 831 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 10 Id. at 835 (“[T]he ability to speak anonymously on the Internet promotes the 
robust exchange of ideas and allows individuals to express themselves freely 
without fear of economic or official retaliation.”). 
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II. THE HISTORY AND RATIONALE: ANONYMOUS SPEECH AND 
THE INTERNET 
A. Development of the First Amendment Right to Anonymous 
Speech 
The right to speak anonymously (or pseudonymously)11 is a 
fundamental First Amendment value which has traditionally been 
protected in our courts.12 As a foundation for this right, courts often 
point to the nation’s “respected tradition of anonymity in the 
advocacy of political causes,” stemming from the seminal Federalist 
Papers, controversial political essays which were penned 
anonymously to protect their authors from personal backlash.13 The 
first case to recognize that the Constitution guarantees at least a 
limited right to anonymous speech was NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson.14 There, the Supreme Court held that the NAACP need 
not comply with a court order to reveal its membership list, as this 
would interfere with the organization’s right to free assembly and 
association.15 Talley v. California16 more formally recognized that 
the First Amendment right to free speech and freedom of the press 
encompassed the right to speak anonymously, especially in the 
context of political speech.17 In Talley, the Court invalidated an 
ordinance which prohibited leafleting without first registering the 
names of those who prepared the leaflets, finding that being forced 
to disclose their identities would burden the leafletters’ freedom of 
expression.18 
                                                 
 11 Much online speech occurs under pseudonyms like usernames, which allow 
a user to accumulate a history of speech in one location without revealing their 
true identity. 
 12 See Jason Martin & Anthony Fargo, Anonymity as a Legal Right: Where and 
Why It Matters, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 311, 328 (2015). 
 13 See In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 14 NCAAP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 15 Id. at 466. 
 16 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
 17 Id. at 64–66 (observing that political speech is a class of speech which is 
thought to be more deserving of protection under the First Amendment than other 
classes of speech). 
 18 Id. at 63. 
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McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission19 was one of the 
Supreme Court’s most decisive statements in support of the right to 
anonymous speech, finding that a state’s prohibition on anonymous 
campaign literature impermissibly burdened anonymous speech 
rights.20 In Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton,21 the Court 
extended anonymous speaker protections beyond the realm of 
political and associational speech, and developed the beginnings of 
the modern anonymous speech balancing test: weighing the 
defendant city’s interest in learning the identity of all local 
canvassers against the defendant’s interest in remaining 
anonymous.22 
The foregoing cases largely constitute the historical basis of the 
First Amendment right to anonymous speech.23 In the modern age, 
many courts have extended these same anonymous speech 
protections to speech on the internet. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that there is “no basis” for qualifying or diminishing the 
level of First Amendment protection that applies to online speech 
versus traditional speech,24 and these principles have naturally 
begun to extend to the right to anonymous online speech.25 
B. Why Anonymous Online Speech Deserves Protection 
While most courts have seen little issue with extending First 
Amendment anonymous speech protections to internet speech, not 
all courts or legal experts agree that anonymous online speech is a 
                                                 
 19 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 20 Id. at 357. 
 21 Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
 22 Id. at 163 (“[O]ur precedent is clear that there must be a balance between [the 
city’s] interests and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights.”). 
 23 See Martin & Fargo, supra note 12, at 328–31. 
 24 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–70 (1997) (explaining that the 
“special factors” which justify lesser First Amendment protection for certain 
speech mediums like radio or cable broadcasting do not apply in the context of 
the internet). 
 25 See Fernando Diaz, Trolling & the First Amendment: Protecting Internet 
Speech in the Era of Cyberbullies & Internet Defamation, 2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. 
& POL’Y 135, 140–43 (2016). 
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good which is deserving of protection.26 There are various 
justifications for the philosophies of those who disfavor anonymous 
online speech. First, some believe that the ubiquitous nature of 
anonymous online speech actually has a restricting effect on the free 
and open exchange of ideas.27 On certain internet forums like blogs 
or message boards, anonymous speech may not aid users in 
discovering new ideas or searching for truth, but may instead 
function to merely reinforce existing beliefs, creating an echo-
chamber of like-minded people agreeing with one another.28 
Anonymity often emboldens these users to act disingenuously, and 
can discourage engagement with challenging or unfamiliar ideas.29 
Some also fear that anonymity enables a host of harmful online 
behaviors, like harassment, stalking, and defamation, with an almost 
complete absence of real-world consequences.30 Scholars point to 
empirical evidence which suggests that online anonymity might 
actually increase anti-social behavior, due to the lack of 
accountability users face for their online speech.31 While these 
anonymous online speakers are shielded from liability for their acts, 
the consequences of their harassment are often deeply felt by their 
victims in the real world, impacting victims’ personal lives and 
causing them to fear for their safety.32 Research has shown that these 
                                                 
 26 See, e.g., Gleicher, supra note 4; Bryan Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 
MD. L. REV. 501 (2013). 
 27 Sophia Qasir, Anonymity in Cyberspace: Judicial and Legislative 
Regulations, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3651, 3670–71 (2013). 
 28 See James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 927, 940 (2011). 
 29 See id. at 941–42. 
 30 See Gleicher, supra note 4, at 324. 
 31 Psychologists have noted that anonymous communication can have both 
disinhibiting and deindividuation effects on a speaker, marked by a decrease in 
self-control and limitations on expressing controversial thoughts, and a greater 
willingness to engage in anti-social behavior. See, e.g., John Suler, The Online 
Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 321 (2004) (noting that 
Internet users often act differently in cyberspace than they might otherwise); see 
also Diane Rowland, Griping, Bitching, and Speaking Your Mind: Defamation 
and Free Expression on the Internet, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 519, 530 (2006) 
(“[A]nonymity is commonly supposed to facilitate unlawful and anti-social 
behavior . . . .”). 
 32 See Gleicher, supra note 4, at 324. 
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kinds of anonymous online attacks have a particularly sharp effect 
on minority groups, as racist, homophobic, and sexist speakers revel 
in the ability to make such anonymous attacks.33 Targeting minority 
groups may impoverish the quality of online dialogue even further 
by discouraging these individuals from participating in certain 
forums or intimidating them into silence.34 
In addition, critics often point out that online anonymity is “a 
great tool for evading detection of illegal and immoral activity,” and 
often hampers the efforts of law enforcement in criminal 
investigations.35 Law enforcement cites online anonymity as a 
driving force behind many cyber-crimes, such as large-scale data 
breaches, identity theft, financial crimes, and media pirating.36 
Citing this multitude of problems stemming from anonymous online 
speech, some scholars have suggested heavily regulating 
anonymous online speech rights, or even banning such speech 
altogether.37 
However, as persuasive as these arguments may appear, 
regulating, restricting, or banning anonymous online speech rights 
would overall be far more detrimental than helpful, and would 
undermine foundational First Amendment rights. While anonymity 
may enable some unsavory behaviors online, it also serves as a “vital 
shield to protect valuable speech.”38 Anonymity can make people far 
more willing to truly speak their mind, lowering participation 
                                                 
 33 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 64 
(2009). 
 34 See Gleicher, supra note 4, at 325. 
 35 Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask 
Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J 815, 829 (2013). 
 36 Jonathan Edelstein, Anonymity and International Law Enforcement in 
Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231, 250 (1996). 
 37 See, e.g., Choi, supra note 26 (arguing in favor of restrictively regulating 
online anonymity, because refraining to do so will harm important liberty 
interests); Michael Park, Restricting Anonymous “Yik Yak”: The Constitutionality 
of Regulating Students’ Off-Campus Online Free Speech in the Age of Social 
Media, 52 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 405 (2016) (examining justifications behind 
schools which have banned students from participating in anonymous online 
speech on certain social media platforms). 
 38 Gleicher, supra note 4, at 331. 
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barriers for “unpopular, marginalized, or shy speakers.”39 Many 
argue that anonymous speech is an essential facet of the democratic 
process, as it is often the only way for speakers with highly 
unpopular views to be heard without risking harassment, social 
ostracization, or loss of employment.40 
Additionally, online anonymity gives speakers an outlet to air 
their views without fear that their message will be discounted solely 
due to their identity. Anonymity allows an audience to evaluate 
speech based solely on the content of the speaker’s ideas, removing 
any potential prejudice that an audience may have felt if they knew 
the speaker’s identity.41 And just as online anonymity can at times 
enable bad actors to hide behind anonymous identities, conversely 
it also allows victims or marginalized individuals to protect 
themselves from becoming targets—anonymous participation 
means it will be much harder for victims to be personally targeted 
for expressing their views online. 
Anonymity concerns espoused by law enforcement present a 
similar double-edged sword—while anonymity allows criminals 
more of a chance at success, it also allows law enforcement a greater 
chance to catch them. Law enforcement regularly uses anonymous 
online interactions to conduct undercover stings and operations, 
techniques which help thwart criminal undertakings like child 
pornography, human trafficking, and terrorism.42 Anonymity also 
aids in the reporting of crimes through the use of anonymous tips 
and hotlines, as many individuals would be entirely unwilling to 
report certain crimes if disclosing their identity was a prerequisite.43 
                                                 
 39 Martin & Fargo, supra note 12, at 332. 
 40 See Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmaksing Jane and John Doe: Online 
Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 407 (2003); 
Qasir, supra note 27, at 3668. 
 41 See Qasir, supra note 27, at 3668 (“[A]nonymity helps ensure that the merits 
or value of the speaker’s message is not discounted, stereotyped, or prejudged on 
the basis of the speaker’s characteristics.”). 
 42 See Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70 
MO. L. REV. 387, 402–04 (2005). 
 43 See 4 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 9.5(i) (5th ed. 2017). 
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Online anonymity also allows the communication of critical 
messages, which would likely not see the light of day if the speaker 
were forced to disclose their identity. Internet speech is a key forum 
for whistleblowers, anonymous employees, and public officials who 
alert the public of high-profile bad acts performed by corporations 
or governments, helping to increase accountability of these entities 
to the public.44 Online anonymity not only allows speakers to convey 
these important messages, it allows anonymous users to seek out 
needed information on controversial or sensitive topics: to seek 
counseling for mental health problems, research medical concerns, 
find advice on sensitive legal issues, or otherwise find answers to 
questions they would not be comfortable asking in person. 
Additionally, the evidence is still mixed when it comes to 
suggestions that online anonymity leads to an increase in anti-social 
behaviors. While some studies cited by opponents of anonymity 
show this result, other studies show the opposite—that non-
anonymous individuals are actually more likely to behave 
aggressively online than anonymous ones.45 Other empirical 
evidence shows that people worldwide recognize and value the 
expressive benefits of online anonymity, as some of the most 
popular websites in the world (such as Reddit46 and Tumblr47) are 
centered around anonymous participation models.48 
                                                 
 44 See Ekstrand, supra note 40, at 407. 
 45 See Rost, Stahel, & Frey, Digital Social Norm Enforcement: Online 
Firestorms in Social Media, PLOS ONE (2016), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0155923 (finding that users who opted to use 
their real names online were more likely to engage in aggressive behaviors, 
especially when discussing controversial issues). 
 46 See Andrew Couts, State of the Web: Reddit, the World’s Best Anonymous 
Social Network, DIGITAL TRENDS (Sep. 11, 2012), https://www.digitaltrends.com
/opinion/reddit-worlds-best-anonymous-social-network/ (discussing the merits of 
Reddit’s anonymous participation model). 
 47 Privacy Policy, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/policy/en/privacy (last 
modified June 13, 2017) (detailing the site’s pseudonymous username system, 
which allows users to remain “fairly anonymous”). 
 48 See, e.g., Carolina Fairchild, Anonymity on Reddit May Be Holding the Social 
Network Back. Its Co-Founder Thinks it’s the Only Thing Pushing It Forward, 
LINKEDIN (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/anonymity-reddit-
may-holding-social-network-back-its-thinks-caroline/. Reddit’s co-founder 
believes anonymity is the site’s “competitive advantage” over other social media 
APR. 2018] Anonymous Speech Post-Judgment 263 
Just as the public has largely embraced anonymous online 
speech, many courts have also recognized the importance of this 
right. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “the ability to speak 
anonymously on the Internet promotes the robust exchange of ideas 
and allows individuals to express themselves freely without fear of 
economic or official retaliation or concern about social ostracism.”49 
The Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized that anonymous 
online speech is “a unique democratizing medium unlike anything 
that has come before,” allowing “meaningful participation in public 
discourse” for many people whose voices have historically been 
silenced due to “financial or status inequalities.”50 The Supreme 
Court has recognized the Internet as a distinctly democratic medium, 
acknowledging its ability to break down barriers that would 
normally prevent speakers from fully participating in public 
discourse.51 
This tendency of courts to regard anonymous online speech as a 
commodity deserving of protection is reflected by the array of cases 
that have wrestled with the issue of when and why a court may 
reveal an anonymous online speaker’s identity against their will. 
When an anonymous online speaker is charged with committing a 
crime online, or becomes the subject of a lawsuit due to their online 
speech, courts are forced to consider how far the right to anonymity 
can extend when the speaker has committed a legitimate wrong.52 
                                                 
sites, as people often choose to visit Reddit to discuss difficult or personal issues 
that “they just can’t bring themselves” to discuss on other identity-linked sites like 
Facebook. Id. Anonymity allows its users a sense of authentic and unconstrained 
personal identity, allowing them to speak their mind freely without worrying 
“what [their] crazy uncle might think” if they had posted their thoughts on a 
traditional social media site. Id. 
 49 In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 50 Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005). 
 51 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 884, 870 (1997) (“Through the use of [the 
Internet], any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox . . . [T]he content on the Internet 
is as diverse as human thought.”). 
 52 Diaz, supra note 25, at 141. 
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III. THE PRECEDENT: ANONYMOUS SPEAKER PRIVILEGE 
DURING DISCOVERY 
Many cases involving anonymous speech protections for online 
speakers center on determining the speaker’s identity during the 
discovery phase of a lawsuit. Courts have responded to this issue by 
adopting a relatively new discovery privilege: the anonymous 
speaker privilege.53 This privilege can be invoked by a defendant to 
protect their anonymous identity when they become subject to a civil 
suit based on their online conduct.54 Although the Supreme Court 
has not specifically addressed issues of anonymous speaker 
privilege and the internet,55 over the years various lower courts have 
developed a “patchwork of state and federal common law balancing 
tests” for determining when and how plaintiffs may overcome the 
anonymous speaker privilege and learn the identity of an 
anonymous online defendant.56 This section presents an overview of 
these balancing tests, and the underlying rationales upon which 
courts have relied to justify disclosing—or refusing to disclose—an 
anonymous speaker’s identity during discovery. 
A. The Mechanics of a Lawsuit Against an Anonymous Defendant 
To begin, it may be helpful to provide an overview of the 
mechanics of a lawsuit against an anonymous defendant, such as an 
online blogger. First, plaintiffs must overcome jurisdictional 
hurdles. Obtaining personal jurisdiction over an anonymous 
defendant is frequently an issue in these suits, as the parties may be 
in different parts of the country, and may not have sufficient 
connections to the forum state to provide personal jurisdiction.57 
However, many states address this issue by employing “long-arm” 
statutes, which provide for jurisdiction over a defendant in another 
                                                 
 53 Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 5, at 250. 
 54 Id. at 250. 
 55 Diaz, supra note 25, at 141 (“To date, the Supreme Court has yet to hear a 
case where the right to anonymous speech on the Internet has been directly 
implicated.”). 
 56 Martin & Fargo, supra note 12, at 370. 
 57 See Jay Zitter, Annotation, First Amendment Protection Afforded to Blogs 
and Bloggers, 35 A.L.R. 407 (2008). 
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state who commits a tort impacting a citizen of the state.58 When a 
plaintiff wants to sue an anonymous blogger, a common tactic is to 
institute an action naming a Doe defendant, and then move to 
compel the blogger’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) to disclose the 
identity of the Internet Protocol address (IP address) holder.59 Suing 
the website host or ISP which hosts the content is generally not a 
feasible option, as the Communications Decency Act60 shields these 
entities from liability for any user-generated materials posted on 
their sites.61 Before granting a motion to disclose, courts often 
require that the plaintiff show they have first made reasonable, 
although ultimately unsuccessful, efforts to locate or contact the 
defendant.62 Additionally, ISPs are often reluctant to provide 
plaintiffs with user account information absent a court order, in an 
effort to protect their customers from frivolous lawsuits.63 Some 
ISPs are even prohibited by law from releasing such user 
information.64 
                                                 
 58 See id. at 407 for an example of common characteristics of such long arm-
statutes. A common structure is to provide that jurisdiction over the out-of-state 
defendant may be established if the defendant regularly solicits business in the 
state, derives substantial revenue from goods or services rendered in the state, or 
derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce in general, and should 
reasonably expect that their act will have repercussions in the state. Id. 
 59 Id. at 407. 
 60 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–623 (2012). 
 61 Id. § 230(c)(2)(A). Website hosts and ISPs cannot be held liable for any user-
generated content posted on their sites, even if that content is “violent, harassing, 
or otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 62 See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 451 (Del. 2005). 
 63 See Ekstrand, supra note 40, at 426–27 (examining the “critical new role” of 
ISPs as “potential defenders of anonymous speech,” and their attempts to balance 
standing up for the rights of their anonymous users against revealing the identities 
of users who have committed legitimate wrongs). 
 64 Some ISPs, like TWC and Comcast, are also cable providers, and as such are 
subject to the regulations of the Cable Privacy Act. This act prohibits cable 
providers from releasing any “personally identifying” customer information, 
unless the request is made pursuant to a court order, and the user is notified before 
disclosure occurs. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B). See also WHITNEY GIBSON, 
SUBPOENA GUIDE FOR IDENTIFYING ANONYMOUS INTERNET POSTERS (2014), 
http://internetdefamationblog.wp.lexblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/
297/2014/07/Supoena-Guide-for-Identifying-Anonymous-Internet-Posters.pdf. 
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Once the court has received the defendant’s identifying 
information from the ISP, or has otherwise verified the anonymous 
defendant’s identity (for example, through in camera review), the 
court must then determine whether the defendant’s identity may be 
revealed to the plaintiff.65 This is where the anonymous speaker 
privilege comes into play. During discovery, the plaintiff will 
typically move to compel disclosure of the defendant’s identity, and 
in response the defendant will invoke the anonymous speaker 
privilege to shield against unwanted disclosure of their identity.66 
However, the privilege is not absolute—it is qualified, and can be 
overcome.67 What exactly a plaintiff must do in order to overcome 
this privilege has been the subject of much debate, and courts have 
developed varying standards that a plaintiff must meet in order to 
learn the identity of their anonymous defendant.68 
B. The Varying Iterations of the Anonymous Speaker Privilege 
The seminal case addressing the anonymous speaker privilege 
during discovery is Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com.69 
The suit involved a trademark infringement claim brought against a 
domain name, which was registered to an unknown defendant.70 
When the plaintiff requested that the defendant’s identity be 
disclosed during discovery, the court set out a four-step test that the 
plaintiff must satisfy in order to learn the anonymous defendant’s 
identity: (1) the plaintiff must identify the anonymous defendant 
with enough specificity to allow a court to determine whether it has 
jurisdiction; (2) the plaintiff must demonstrate it has made a good 
faith effort to locate the defendant; (3) the plaintiff must establish 
that their suit can withstand a motion to dismiss, on its merits; and 
(4) the plaintiff must file a discovery request showing specific 
                                                 
 65  Zitter, supra note 57. 
 66  Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 5, at 255. 
 67  Id. 
 68 Id. (“What the party seeking disclosure must show to overcome the 
[anonymous speaker] privilege has been the subject of more debate than the 
existence of the privilege itself.”). 
 69 Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 70 Id. at 576. 
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reasons why revealing the defendant’s identity is needed.71 If the 
plaintiff accomplishes each of these steps, the court will then engage 
in a balancing test to determine if the defendant’s identity should be 
revealed, weighing the plaintiff’s need to learn the defendant’s 
identity against the “legitimate and valuable right to participate in 
online forums anonymously.”72 The court emphasized that these 
procedural hurdles were necessary to protect against the dangers of 
unmasking defendants who have potentially done nothing wrong, 
noting that “[p]eople who have committed no wrong should be able 
to participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass 
or embarrass them can . . . gain the power of the court’s order to 
discover their identity.”73 
Subsequently, other courts have expanded upon this pioneering 
test from Seescandy.com. Different courts have set out a variety of 
different evidentiary showings that plaintiffs must demonstrate in 
order to learn the identity of an anonymous online defendant, once 
again relying on the rationale that a defendant’s First Amendment 
right to anonymity should not be overturned hastily, until it is clear 
the plaintiff actually has a viable case.74 In Dendrite International, 
Inc. v. Doe No. 3,75 the test was expanded to require that a plaintiff 
show not just the ability to survive a motion to dismiss, but also must 
show “sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of 
action, on a prima facie basis,” creating a markedly higher 
standard.76 Other courts have similarly raised the necessary 
showing—in Doe v. Cahill,77 the court held that a plaintiff seeking 
to unmask an anonymous defendant during discovery must first 
                                                 
 71 Id. at 578. The court formulated this four-part test to “ensure that this unusual 
procedure will only be employed in cases where the plaintiff has in good faith 
exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a civil defendant pre-service, and 
will prevent use of this method to harass or intimidate.” Id. 
 72 Id. at 579. 
 73 Id. at 578. 
 74 Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 5, at 255–70. 
 75 Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 342 N.J. Super. 134 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
 76 Id. at 141. 
 77 Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
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satisfy a summary judgment standard.78 The Cahill court was 
concerned about the likelihood that these kinds of suits would 
intimidate anonymous posters into “self-censoring their comments 
or simply not commenting at all” if they know that their identities 
could be easily discovered by anyone who chooses to sue them—
hence the court’s insistence that plaintiffs first meet the demanding 
summary judgment standard.79 Thus, courts mostly agree that the 
anonymous speaker privilege requires plaintiffs to meet some higher 
showing of proof than is required in an ordinary lawsuit in order to 
uncover an anonymous defendant’s identity during discovery. 
IV. THE CASE: A NEW BALANCING TEST FOR PROTECTING 
ANONYMITY POST-JUDGMENT 
While the general procedure of unmasking an anonymous 
defendant during discovery is now well established (although the 
specific evidentiary showing that the plaintiff must meet still 
depends upon jurisdiction),80 until recently no case had yet 
determined what procedure must be followed when deciding 
whether to unmask an anonymous internet defendant after a 
judgment has already been rendered.81 In Signature Management 
Team LLC v. Doe, the Sixth Circuit addressed this issue of first 
impression in November 2017.82 This case required a 
reconsideration of the anonymous speaker privilege, as the factors 
which weigh upon a court’s decision to reveal an anonymous 
identity post-judgment differ considerably from the factors a court 
considers during the discovery process. During discovery, the 
courts’ main priority has been protecting the speech rights of 
                                                 
 78 Id. at 460 (“We conclude that the summary judgement standard is the 
appropriate test by which to strike the balance between a defamation plaintiff’s 
right to protect his reputation and a defendant’s right to exercise free speech 
anonymously.”). 
 79 Id. at 457. 
 80 See Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 5, at 255–70. 
 81 Alexis Kramer, Sixth Circuit Sets Rules for Unmasking Blogger After 
Judgement, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.bna.com/sixth-
circuit-sets-n73014472562/ (“The decision is the first to consider the 
circumstances under which a court can protect an author’s anonymity post-
judgement.”). 
 82 Signature Mgmt. Team LLC v. Doe, 876 F.3d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 2017). 
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anonymous defendants against potentially trivial or malicious suits, 
but these considerations disappear in the post-judgment context, 
where the defendant has already been found liable for some wrong.83 
A. The District Court’s Holding 
In Signature Management, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the 
district court’s refusal to unmask an anonymous blogger who had 
been found to have infringed the plaintiff’s copyright.84 Signature 
Management Team (“Signature”), a multi-level marketing 
company85 that sells materials designed to help other multi-level 
marketing businesses succeed, sued Doe for posting their 
copyrighted materials on his blog.86 Doe’s blog “Amthrax” is 
devoted to criticizing multi-level marketing companies, and in 
January 2013 Doe posted an article including a link to a 
downloadable copy of one of Signature’s copyrighted works, “The 
Team Builder’s Textbook.”87 Signature served the blog’s host with 
a DMCA takedown notice,88 and Doe quickly removed the link from 
the site.89 Nevertheless, Signature proceeded to file suit, alleging one 
count of copyright infringement, seeking injunctive relief to prevent 
Doe from publishing any of their works in the future.90 When 
Signature moved to compel discovery of Doe’s identity, Doe 
                                                 
 83 Id. at 835–37.  
 84 Id. at 834. 
 85 Multi-level marketing companies (often referred to as “pyramid schemes”) 
are often criticized for their predatory business practices. Multi-Level Marketing, 
Pyramid Schemes, BETTER BUS. BUREAU (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.bbb.org/
centralohio/industry-tips/read/tip/multi-level-marketing-pyramid-schemes-bbb-
tips-66. 
 86 Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 834. 
 87 Id. 
 88 When a copyright holder’s material is infringed on the internet, a common 
first step is to issue a takedown notice to the site’s ISP under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA). Under the DCMA, if the site 
“expeditiously” removes the infringing content, the ISP is then granted immunity 
from liability for any copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998). 
 89 Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 834. 
 90 Id. Signature sought only injunctive relief, and did not request damages for 
Doe’s infringement. 
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asserted a fair use defense to the copyright claim, as well as a First 
Amendment defense of the right to speak anonymously.91 
In determining whether to grant the motion to disclose Doe’s 
identity, the district court relied on the balancing test from Art of 
Living Foundation v. Does.92 This test requires that the party seeking 
disclosure of an anonymous identity first meet a summary judgment 
standard,93 and if this evidentiary showing is made, the court will 
then determine if unmasking is warranted by weighing the 
magnitude of potential harms to both plaintiff and defendant.94 
Applying this test, the district court declined to unmask Doe during 
discovery, reasoning that unmasking an anonymous speaker is a 
significant and irreversible harm, and that there was a chance that 
Doe would succeed on his fair use defense.95 In the end, the district 
court granted summary judgment for Signature but still refused to 
unmask Doe, finding that identifying him was unnecessary to ensure 
that he would not engage in any further infringement of Signature’s 
                                                 
 91 Id.; see also C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Extent of Doctrine of “Fair Use” 
Under Federal Copyright Act, 23 A.L.R.3d 139. Unlike a patent, a copyright of a 
work does not give the copyright owner “the exclusive right to use” the work. Id. 
A fair use defense is essentially a claim that no copyright violation has occurred, 
as the user was merely engaging in a legitimate and fair use of the work. 
 92 Art of Living Found. v. Does, No. 10-CV-05022-LHK, 2011 WL 5444622, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011). This balancing test was developed to address a 
pre-trial discovery dispute, in which the plaintiff appealed from an order denying 
his motion to quash a subpoena by the defendant, intended to compel his ISP to 
reveal his identity. Id. The Court concluded that Doe’s right to anonymous speech 
outweighed the plaintiff’s need for discovery of his identity. Id. 
 93 This party must produce “competent evidence supporting a finding of each 
fact that is essential to a given cause of action.” Id. at 21. 
 94 Id. at 13. This involves the court considering the competing claims of injury 
from both plaintiff and defendant and considering “the effect on each party of the 
granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Id. For the defendant, these 
interests may include the possibility that disclosure will deter the defendants and 
other anonymous bloggers from exercising their First Amendment rights. Id. For 
the plaintiff, these interests may include whether the plaintiff truly has a need to 
discover the defendant’s identity in order to proceed with their suit (such as when 
necessary to effect service of process). Id. 
 95 Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 835. 
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works.96 Signature then appealed, petitioning the Sixth Circuit to 
grant its request to identify Doe. 
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Holding 
The scope of the issue on appeal was whether and when a court 
may identify an anonymous defendant post-judgment, after the 
defendant has been found liable.97 The court emphasized that this 
was a novel question, distinct from typical anonymous defendant 
cases.98 The litany of balancing tests typically used by courts when 
determining whether to unmask an anonymous defendant during 
discovery are designed to safeguard against unmasking potentially 
non-liable defendants, whereas in this context the defendant had 
already been found liable.99 
The court first stipulated that in the post-judgment context there 
exists a presumption in favor of unmasking an anonymous 
defendant, when that defendant has been found liable and judgment 
has been entered for the plaintiff.100 The court’s rationale for 
instating this presumption stems from a factor unconsidered by the 
district court: the presumption in favor of open judicial 
proceedings.101 The court emphasized that there exists a strong 
presumption that judicial records (including the names of litigants) 
remain open and unconcealed from the public, and only the most 
compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.102 
The greater the public’s interest in the litigation’s subject matter, the 
greater the showing necessary to overcome the general presumption 
of open public access to court records.103 
                                                 
 96 Signature initially sought a permanent injunction to prevent Doe from 
infringing any of their works, but the court found a permanent injunction 
unnecessary to prevent further infringement. Id. at 834–35. This is because when 
the suit began, Doe had certified to the court that he had already destroyed all 
copies of Signature’s works in his possession. Id. 
 97 Id. at 835. 
 98 See id. at 836. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 837. 
 101 Id. at 836. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 837. 
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After establishing this principle, the court fully introduced its 
new three-factor balancing test, to be used in determining whether 
to unmask an anonymous defendant who has been found liable.104 
For the first two balancing factors, courts must consider the extent 
of the public’s interest in open judicial records, as well as the 
plaintiff’s need to learn the anonymous defendant’s identity in order 
to enforce its remedy.105 The greater the plaintiff’s (and the public’s) 
interest in unmasking a Doe defendant, the more difficult it will be 
for the anonymous defendant to overcome the presumption of 
openness and maintain their anonymity.106 As a third balancing 
factor, when the anonymous defendant’s speech is found to be 
unprotected by the First Amendment,107 the defendant must establish 
that they engage in significant protected, anonymous speech that 
would be chilled if their identity were disclosed.108 
For the first factor, the public’s interest in open judicial records, 
the court put forth several examples of considerations that may help 
gauge the extent of public interest in an anonymous defendant’s 
identity.109 The court provided the example of a libel case, and stated 
that the public interest in an anonymous libeler’s identity would be 
heightened when the speech is intentionally libelous, made to a large 
audience, or regarding a matter of public concern, and conversely, 
that the public interest would be diminished when the speech was 
merely negligent, read by few people, and on a matter of private or 
personal concern.110 Similarly, the court explained that in a copyright 
infringement case, the public’s interest would be greater when the 
material is a “best-selling novel,” rather than a “sparsely read 
instruction manual.”111 
                                                 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Certain established categories of speech do not receive First Amendment 
protection, due to their dangerous or hurtful nature (threats, obscenity, fighting 
words, defamation, copyright infringement, etc.). See U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 
709, 717 (2012). 
 108 Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 837. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
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For the second factor, the plaintiff’s need to unmask the 
defendant, the court explained that the presumption of disclosure is 
stronger when the plaintiff must identify the defendant in order to 
properly enforce its rights.112 This can be determined by looking to 
the nature of the remedy.113 The court reasoned that plaintiffs who 
are awarded an ongoing remedy, such as a permanent injunction, 
will have a stronger interest in unmasking (knowing the defendant’s 
identity is necessary to ensure that they continue to comply), 
whereas a plaintiff who deals with a cooperative defendant, who has 
already complied with all relief ordered, will have little interest in 
unmasking.114 Courts may also incentivize anonymous defendants to 
comply with judgments by conditioning their continued anonymity 
on satisfaction of the judgment within a specified time frame.115 
For the third factor, the defendant’s interest in anonymous 
speech, the court stipulated that an anonymous defendant can 
challenge the presumption of open records by showing that they 
engage in substantial protected anonymous speech which would be 
chilled should their identity be revealed.116 To show this, a defendant 
may demonstrate that unmasking would “hinder his ability to 
engage in anonymous speech in the future,” by deterring his desire 
or ability to engage in future anonymous speech.117 
However, after laying out all of these guidelines, the court 
declined to issue a ruling on the merits, instead remanding to the 
district court to apply this new three-factor balancing test to the 
specific facts of this case.118 The district court has not yet issued this 
remanded ruling, and the effects of this new balancing test remain 
to be seen. The following section presents an analysis of the court’s 
holding in Signature Management, and its potential effects on the 
continued vitality of the right to anonymous speech online. 
                                                 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 838. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 838–39. 
 118 Id. 
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V. THE OUTCOME: AN IMPORTANT RECOGNITION OF 
ANONYMOUS SPEAKER RIGHTS DESPITE PROBLEMATIC 
RATIONALES AND UNCERTAIN RAMIFICATIONS 
Overall, this case represents a modest step forward for the 
privacy rights of online anonymous speakers. However, some of the 
rationales underlying the decision are problematic, and could prove 
detrimental to anonymous speakers’ rights if the principles from this 
case gain traction among other courts. 
A. The Good: An Important Recognition 
First, the good news. This case represents the first time that a 
federal appellate court has recognized that First Amendment 
protections for anonymous online speakers can extend post-
judgment—that an anonymous blogger will not automatically lose 
the right to keep their identity secret just because they have been 
found liable in a lawsuit.119 Even if a speaker has committed a 
recognized wrong against the plaintiff, this does not necessarily 
mean that the speaker must give up her right to anonymity. Although 
the procedures surrounding unmasking anonymous defendants 
during discovery were more or less well settled before this case, it 
remained an open question whether this right to anonymity 
continued after a defendant was found liable for a civil claim.120 The 
court recognizes the importance of the right to speak anonymously, 
acknowledging that revealing a speaker’s hidden identity can have 
detrimental, chilling effects on their future speech activities—
activities which deserve protection.121 
This recognition is important because, as detailed above, not all 
courts or legal experts agree that anonymous online speech deserves 
robust protection.122 As indicated by the dissenting opinion in this 
case, some believe that once a speaker has engaged in unprotected 
speech on the internet (defamation, copyright infringement, threats, 
etc.), he should lose all right to keep his identity secret.123 Some 
                                                 
 119 See Mackey, supra note 8. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 835–37. 
 122 See supra text accompanying notes 26–37. 
 123 The dissent suggested that because Doe engaged in unprotected speech when 
he infringed Signature’s copyright, his identity should have automatically been 
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believe that the right to anonymous speech online is actually more 
detrimental to the marketplace of ideas than it is helpful, and 
consequently that anonymous online speakers deserve little in the 
form of protection.124 
Here, the Sixth Circuit wisely chose not to buy into these 
rationales, and instead emphasized the importance of the right to 
anonymous speech. The court explained that the right to anonymous 
online speech is “paramount to protect the political speech of 
persecuted groups,” while helping to promote “the robust exchange 
of ideas and allows individuals to express themselves freely without 
fear of . . . retaliation.”125 In reaching its holding that even guilty 
defendants do not automatically surrender their right to anonymity, 
the court took an important stand against the erosion of this 
foundational right. 
B. The Bad: Problematic Rationales and Uncertain Ramifications 
Next, the bad news. As promising as this black-letter holding 
may seem at first glance, the court reached this conclusion using 
some concerning rationales, which may yield unforeseen harmful 
effects on the right to anonymous speech in subsequent cases. 
1. A Backwards Standard 
Firstly, and perhaps most detrimentally, the court held that when 
an anonymous defendant is found liable, there exists a presumption 
in favor of revealing the defendant’s identity.126 Under this standard, 
when judgment is entered against a defendant, the default option is 
to then disclose that defendant’s identity to the plaintiff and the 
public.127 The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate to the court 
                                                 
revealed: no balancing of the defendant’s interests was required, because as soon 
as Doe “posted that hyperlink” his speech lost all First Amendment protections 
(including the right to anonymity). See Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 839–40 
(Suhrheinrich J., dissenting). 
 124 See, e.g., Gleicher, supra note 4 (noting that online anonymity can result in 
an increase in uncivilized and outrageous behavior, enabling “faceless crowds of 
online tormentors” to harass targets without consequence). 
 125 Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 835. 
 126 Id. at 836. 
 127 Id. 
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why this unmasking is unwarranted, and if they cannot meet this 
burden, they will be exposed.128 
Given the court’s emphasis on the value of anonymous speech 
and its concerns with chilling the speech of anonymous defendants, 
this standard seems backwards. Protecting an individual’s 
constitutional right to anonymous speech should be the default, 
while the party seeking to reveal the defendant’s identity should bear 
the burden of explaining to the court exactly why this unmasking is 
warranted, and why they really need to know the speaker’s identity. 
The right to anonymous speech is uniquely fragile, as identifying an 
anonymous speaker has “irreparable consequences”—once an 
identity is disclosed, the damage cannot be undone.129 This is 
especially true in the age of the internet, when all of a person’s 
history is permanently on display with a simple search. The court’s 
formulation of this presumption in favor of unmasking does not 
show sufficient caution when deciding whether to reveal an identity, 
a move from which there is no going back.130 
This backwards presumption also creates a further risk of abuse 
of the legal process simply to intimidate speakers into silence. Past 
cases have shown that the anonymous speaker discovery process is 
open to abuse by corporate actors—in Raytheon v. John Does, a 
corporation sued 21 anonymous users of a Yahoo! message board 
for allegedly disclosing the company’s proprietary information.131 
The users, all present or former employees of Raytheon, used the 
message board to discuss topics like the company’s stock price, 
staffing, and business deals.132 However, after the corporation 
successfully obtained the identities of the 21 individuals from the 
site, it promptly filed a voluntary dismissal of the suit.133 Online 
                                                 
 128 Id. 
 129 Martin & Fargo, supra note 12. 
 130 See infra text accompanying notes 121–123 for an example of the kinds of 
consequences that can befall an individual when their anonymous online identity 
is revealed. 
 131 Raytheon Drops Suit Over Internet Chat, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 22, 
1999), 
https://partners.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/05/biztech/articles/22raytheon.html. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
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privacy advocates accused the corporation of misusing the power of 
the courts to obtain the identities of these users, saying that the true 
object of the suit was to intimidate the anonymous speakers into 
silence, rather than actually seeking to remedy a legal wrong.134 
Here, given the court’s presumption in favor of unmasking once a 
defendant has been found liable, this may create an even greater risk 
that corporations or other powerful actors will abuse the power of 
the courts to unearth the identities of those who criticize them, 
seeking not to remedy legitimate wrongs but to frighten their critics 
into silence. 
2. The Public’s Legitimate Interest 
Next, there are several problematic rationales underlying the 
court’s new three-factor balancing test for determining whether an 
anonymous defendant’s identity can be revealed. The first of these 
factors is the public’s interest in open judicial records, and by 
extension, its interest in learning the anonymous defendant’s 
identity. It is the leap between these two interests which is 
concerning. The purpose of allowing open access to judicial records 
is to let the public monitor “what its government is up to,” contribute 
to maintenance of trust in the legal system, and to promote 
acceptance of judicial outcomes as fair and balanced.135 However, it 
is not apparent that unmasking a defendant who would prefer to 
remain anonymous will appeal to any of these principles, or 
engender any sort of increased trust in the system. Rather, it seems 
that unmasking an anonymous defendant appeals to the public’s 
baser motives—the desire to know who has engaged in what 
scandalous private acts, to know who is behind which undercover 
blog, or who is acting as a whistleblower where. Instead of playing 
to these ignoble interests, the court could better frame this factor of 
its balancing test by considering only the public’s legitimate interest 
in discovering the defendant’s identity. Where issues of public 
importance, politics, current events, or governance are involved, the 
public may have a very legitimate interest in knowing who was 
                                                 
 134 David Sobel, The Process that “John Doe” Is Due: Addressing the Legal 
Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH 3, 15 (2000). 
 135 Mackey, supra note 8. 
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behind certain anonymous speech acts.136 However, when learning 
the defendant’s identity would only satisfy the public’s desire for 
gossip, the court should disregard these motivations in favor of 
protecting a defendant’s First Amendment rights.137 It seems wiser 
to consider not just what the public wants to know, but why they 
want to know it. 
3. The Effect of Unmasking on Past and Future Speech 
The court’s third balancing factor is the extent to which 
unmasking an anonymous defendant will chill their future protected 
speech activities. The court recognized that Doe’s anonymous blog 
was entitled to general free speech protections, but that the 
copyright-infringing speech featured on his blog was not entitled to 
such protection. The court was concerned that revealing Doe’s 
identity would impact “both [his] protected and unprotected speech” 
and “might hinder his ability to engage in anonymous speech in the 
future.”138 The court’s analysis hinges entirely on Doe’s future 
speech—once his identity is revealed, how will his future speech 
                                                 
 136 See Cynthia Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an 
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1990). 
Under First Amendment case law, it is an established principle that speech on 
“matters of public concern” is considered to be more deserving of legal protection 
than speech on matters of merely private concern. Id. However, determining 
which topics are issues of public concern and which are not has been the subject 
of much debate in the courts. Id. How courts make these classifications has raised 
many questions—does a topic become a matter of public concern simply because 
most of the public is, indeed, concerned about it, or is matter deemed to be of 
public concern because it encompasses some topic of intrinsically higher value? 
Id. 
 137 For guidance in determining when an anonymous defendant’s speech 
concerns issues of legitimate public interest, courts may look to prior First 
Amendment cases discerning between matters of public and private concern. 
Though the test is somewhat vague, speech is generally considered of public 
concern when it relates to “any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 
community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest.” See also Snyder 
v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011). Compare Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss 
Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (plurality opinion) (finding a report that an 
individual once filed for bankruptcy to be a topic of private concern), with Snyder, 
562 U.S. at 454 (determining that the military’s policies on homosexuality are of 
public concern). 
 138 Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 839. 
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activities be impacted? This rationale, while valid, seems to be 
missing an important piece of the puzzle—what consequences will 
befall Doe due to his past speech, once his identity is revealed? 
Anonymous bloggers often write on topics which are 
controversial, politically heated, or so deeply personal that authors 
would never say such things if their name was attached. If an 
anonymous blogger is unveiled, they may face harsh, real-world 
consequences for speech which they have already engaged in, to say 
nothing of the effects on their future speech. As an example of these 
kinds of consequences, consider the case of McVeigh v. Cohen.139 
There, an anonymous internet user (McVeigh) was “outed” as gay 
after his ISP disclosed his AOL account information and post history 
to his employer, the US Navy. He was subsequently dishonorably 
discharged from the military due to his prior online postings 
identifying himself as gay. Although McVeigh was eventually 
vindicated in court years later,140 he suffered through disastrous real-
life consequences after his anonymous online identity was stripped 
away, losing his job and livelihood, and finding himself ostracized 
for parts of his identity which he had deeply desired to remain 
private.141 Notably, he suffered these negative affects entirely due to 
the content of his past anonymous speech online. This demonstrates 
that often the most harmful effect of revealing an anonymous 
internet user’s true identity will stem from speech in which the user 
has already engaged. 
In addition to the repercussions felt by the speaker related to 
their past speech if their anonymous identity is revealed, their 
friends and family may also face unpleasant consequences simply 
by association. Modernly, the right to privacy encompasses not just 
a speaker’s right to keep her identity secret, but also the rights of 
those she associates with to not have their secrets revealed. Imagine 
an anonymous blog which focuses on family relationships, which 
                                                 
 139 McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215, 219 (D. D.C. 1998). 
 140 See McVeigh v. Cohen, 996 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1998) (granting 
McVeigh’s injunction ordering the Navy to re-instate him to his previous or a 
similar position). 
 141 See Philip Shenon, Sailor Victorious in Gay Case of On-Line Privacy, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 12, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/12/us/sailor-victorious-
in-gay-case-of-on-line-privacy.html. 
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frequently discusses personal arguments or incidents within the 
blogger’s family. Revealing this blogger’s identity would not only 
injure them, but would also constitute a sharp invasion of privacy 
for all of their family members, people who perhaps may not even 
realize they were the subject of a blog. Or in the present case, 
imagine if the anonymous blogger behind Amthrax had family 
members who work for a multi-level marketing company, whose 
jobs may be in jeopardy if their employer realizes they associate 
with someone who has deliberately infringed the company’s 
copyrighted work. Revealing a user’s closely-held anonymous 
identity against their will has a ripple effect, inflicting harm not only 
upon the wrong-doing user, but upon many individuals in their 
periphery who have often done nothing to deserve such an invasion 
of privacy. 
The court’s framing of the right to anonymity represents that the 
only impact an unmasking will have is on the defendant’s future 
speech, but this framework seems to seriously misinterpret the true 
value of anonymity to individuals, and the consequences they may 
face once that anonymity is lost. A better way to frame this third 
factor would be to instead consider the degree of consequences, in 
general, that the defendant would face if their identity is revealed—
do they risk endangering their safety or losing their job, or merely 
embarrassment and annoyance? The extent to which an unmasking 
will chill future speech should certainly be a consideration in the 
balance, but not the only consideration. 
4. A Dangerous Precedent for Anonymous Plaintiffs 
A final risk that this decision creates is the possibility that the 
court’s rationales may someday be extended to create a similar 
presumption of post-judgment unmasking for anonymous 
plaintiffs—parties who often have a very good reason for remaining 
anonymous during a lawsuit.142 Although it is uncommon,143 courts 
                                                 
 142 See Mackey, supra note 8. 
 143 This practice is uncommon because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 10 requires that a complaint “must name of all the parties,” creating a 
presumption that parties must disclose their names in order to bring a lawsuit. See 
Jayne Ressler, Privacy, Plaintiffs, and Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe Plaintiff 
in the Information Age, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 195 (2004). 
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have developed a practice of “permitting individuals to sue under 
fictitious names in certain circumstances.”144 Similar to the 
balancing tests which govern the anonymous speaker privilege, 
courts have come up with a variety of factors that must be balanced 
when considering whether to allow a plaintiff to file suit 
anonymously.145 Generally, this involves balancing the need to 
protect the privacy of the plaintiff, especially where the subject 
matter of the case is of a “sensitive and highly personal nature,” 
against the legitimate interest of the public in knowing the pertinent 
facts of the case (such as the parties’ identities).146 Examples of cases 
in which plaintiffs are often permitted to proceed anonymously 
include abortion cases, cases addressing the invasion of privacy, and 
cases involving the victims of crimes.147 
Here, the court’s creation of a new presumption in favor of 
unmasking an anonymous defendant could have unfortunate 
consequences if other courts adopt this principle and begin to apply 
this presumption in the context of anonymous plaintiffs. Given that 
courts already only allow plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in 
exceptional cases, an extra assumption in favor of disclosing the 
plaintiff’s identity post-judgment, should they lose their suit, would 
present a heavy blow to anonymous plaintiffs. This issue is 
compounded by the ease of electronic access to court documents in 
the modern era. In the past, public records like court documents were 
only available locally, often involving “a treasure hunt around the 
country to a series of local offices to dig up records.”148 But with the 
growth of electronic record systems like PACER,149 court records 
are now consolidated into conveniently searchable databases; the 
minute details of each court proceeding can easily be obtained by 
                                                 
 144 Francis Dougherty, Annotation, Property and Effect of Use of Fictitious 
Name of Plaintiff in Federal Court, 97 A.L.R. FED. 369 (1990). 
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 148 Daniel Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2002). 
 149 Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) is an electronic public 
access service provided by the federal judiciary. It allows users to obtain case and 
docket information from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts. 
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anyone with an internet connection.150 Due to the ubiquity of systems 
like this, once an anonymous identity is disclosed to a court or 
defendant, it could also become widely known to the public in a very 
short period of time. If these anonymous plaintiffs run the risk of 
having their identity openly revealed if they lose their lawsuit, this 
would likely discourage many from bringing suit in the first place, 
cutting off access to justice for those who have experienced wrongs 
of a highly personal or private nature. When plaintiffs are forced to 
abandon their legitimate claims for fear of their identity being 
disclosed, this injures not just the individual plaintiffs but society as 
a whole.151 Society loses the ability to seek justice for victims, to 
pursue valid claims against dangerous perpetrators, and to create 
valuable precedent for use in future cases.152 The right of both 
plaintiffs and defendants to proceed anonymously is crucial to the 
workings of the judicial system, and the court’s new presumption in 
favor of unmasking creates a worrisome precedent for the privacy 
rights of these vulnerable individuals. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For now, Signature Management represents a measured success 
for strengthening First Amendment protections for anonymous 
online speakers. The court’s recognition that an anonymous 
defendant does not automatically forfeit their right to anonymity 
once they lose a lawsuit is an admirable holding in this issue of first 
impression. While there still remain some serious concerns about 
the court’s assumptions on the nature of online anonymity, and the 
case’s possible extension to future precedents, as it stands this 
decision represents a modest success for the right to privacy and 
unhindered freedom of expression on the internet. 
 
                                                 
 150 See Ressler, supra note 143, at 204. 
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 152 See id. at 220 (discussing an example of a female university employee who 
filed a sexual harassment complaint against the president of the university, but 
who later chose to withdraw her complaint after learning that the complaint was 
considered a matter of public record and her identity would have to be disclosed 
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